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Abstract
Prestige-biased social learning (henceforth “prestige-bias”) occurs when individuals pre-
dominantly choose to learn from a prestigious member of their group, i.e. someone who has
gained attention, respect and admiration for their success in some domain. Prestige-bias is
proposed as an adaptive social-learning strategy as it provides a short-cut to identifying suc-
cessful group members, without having to assess each person’s success individually. Previ-
ous work has documented prestige-bias and verified that it is used adaptively. However, the
domain-specificity and generality of prestige-bias has not yet been explicitly addressed
experimentally. By domain-specific prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn
from a prestigious model only within the domain of expertise in which the model acquired
their prestige. By domain-general prestige-bias we mean that individuals choose to learn
from prestigious models in general, regardless of the domain in which their prestige was
earned. To distinguish between domain specific and domain general prestige we ran an
online experiment (n = 397) in which participants could copy each other to score points on a
general-knowledge quiz with varying topics (domains). Prestige in our task was an emergent
property of participants’ copying behaviour. We found participants overwhelmingly preferred
domain-specific (same topic) prestige cues to domain-general (across topic) prestige cues.
However, when only domain-general or cross-domain (different topic) cues were available,
participants overwhelmingly favoured domain-general cues. Finally, when given the choice
between cross-domain prestige cues and randomly generated Player IDs, participants
favoured cross-domain prestige cues. These results suggest participants were sensitive to
the source of prestige, and that they preferred domain-specific cues even though these
cues were based on fewer samples (being calculated from one topic) than the domain-gen-
eral cues (being calculated from all topics). We suggest that the extent to which people
employ a domain-specific or domain-general prestige-bias may depend on their experience
and understanding of the relationships between domains.
PLOS ONE







Citation: Brand CO, Mesoudi A, Morgan TJH
(2021) Trusting the experts: The domain-specificity
of prestige-biased social learning. PLoS ONE 16(8):
e0255346. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0255346
Editor: Miguel A. Vadillo, Universidad Autonoma de
Madrid, SPAIN
Received: December 16, 2020
Accepted: July 14, 2021
Published: August 11, 2021
Peer Review History: PLOS recognizes the
benefits of transparency in the peer review
process; therefore, we enable the publication of
all of the content of peer review and author
responses alongside final, published articles. The
editorial history of this article is available here:
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346
Copyright: © 2021 Brand et al. This is an open
access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License, which
permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided the original
author and source are credited.
Data Availability Statement: The data underlying




The field of cultural evolution seeks to explain broad patterns of cultural change and variation
in terms of, amongst other factors, the means by which information is passed from person to
person via ‘social learning biases’ [1–5]. Here, ‘bias’ is meant in the statistical sense of a system-
atic departure from randomly choosing another person from whom to learn (rather than the
normative sense of ‘bias’, implying error or mistakes). Examples of such social learning biases
include copying the majority (conformity), copying older individuals, copying when uncer-
tain, or copying prestigious individuals [6]. In this study we focus on the latter: prestige-biased
social learning (henceforth prestige-bias), which occurs when learners preferentially learn
from individuals who are copied by others, attended to by others, or who generally receive
freely conferred deference from others [7–14]. These individuals are said to have ‘prestige’.
Prestige-bias has been proposed as an adaptive social learning strategy as it provides an effi-
cient short-cut to acquiring adaptive social information when more direct means (e.g. identify-
ing and copying the most skillful/knowledgeable individuals) are unavailable or costly [11].
According to the cultural evolutionary theory of prestige, prestige-bias is only adaptive because
the prestige was first acquired due to success, such that prestige-cues (e.g. being copied by, or
receiving attention from others) are indirect proxies for success [11]. Consistent with this the-
ory, our previous experimental work shows that participants use prestige information (e.g.
who others are copying) when selecting a model from whom to socially learn, but only when
a) the prestige information is to some extent related to success and b) direct success informa-
tion (e.g. score) is unavailable [7]. Importantly, such conclusions were obtained when prestige
was an emergent property of participants’ behaviour during the experiment; no deception or
manipulation of prestige was employed at any time, thus providing a naturalistic test of the
prestige bias theory [7].
Here we build on our previous study [7] by exploring the domain-specificity or domain-
generality of prestige-bias, which remains poorly understood. By the terms ‘domain-specific-
ity’ and ‘domain-generality’ we mean whether a prestigious individual’s influence is limited to
the specific domain in which they are successful (domain-specific prestige) or whether presti-
gious individuals who are successful in one domain become influential even outside their
domain of expertise (domain-general prestige). For example, extremely prestigious individuals
who have gained fame for their expertise are often used as a source of advice outside the
domain in which they gained expertise, such as famous sportspeople giving political or medical
advice.
Consequently, we can ask whether social learners specifically copy individuals who are pres-
tigious in the domain of interest (domain-specific prestige-bias), or if they copy individuals
who are prestigious regardless of the source of this prestige (domain-general prestige-bias).
For instance, is a successful and prestigious boat-builder sought out for advice on all kinds of
general matters, or is their influence limited to their specific craft? In the original specification
of prestige bias, Henrich & Gil-White, p.170 [11] suggest that “. . .prestige hierarchies can be
domain-specific. For example, if I defer to you because of your superior computer skills and
you defer to Bob because he is an excellent grass hockey player, I may not give Bob any special
deference if grass hockey is not my thing,” [11]. However, they also go on to suggest that “pres-
tigious individuals are influential even beyond their domain of expertise,” p.184 [11], and it is
often claimed in the literature that prestigious celebrities who have acquired fame via a specific
domain, such as sport or acting, have influence beyond their domain of expertise (see [15] for
examples and critical discussion). As such, the domain-specificity of prestige-bias remains
unclear.
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We suggest that domain-general prestige-bias will be adaptive when success across different
domains is correlated. As noted by Henrich & Gil-White, “much of the information that leads
to success in one domain will often be transferable to others. . . acquiring skill in one domain
(e.g. a martial art) is often touted as promoting success in many other areas. For example,
problem-solving methods, goal-achieving strategies, eye-hand coordination, control over
one’s emotions, etc. are useful across several domains,” [11]. Henrich & Gil-White go on to
suggest that “because figuring out which combinations of ideas, beliefs, and behaviours make
someone successful is costly and difficult, selection favoured a general copying bias, which also
tends to make prestigious individuals generally influential (as people copy and internalise their
opinions).” (p.184). We suggest that the domain-generality of prestige-bias is an open empiri-
cal question, and is dependent on not only how correlated the domains in question are, but
also whether observers have an accurate perception of these correlations.
Previous research shows some evidence of the domain-specificity of prestige-bias. One
experimental study found that 3–4 year old children preferentially copied the artefact choice of
a prestigious demonstrator, defined as the demonstrator to whom bystanders had attended
rather than ignored, when their prestige was acquired during an artefact task (i.e. in the same
domain), but not when it was acquired on a food-preference task (i.e. in a different domain)
[10]. The reverse preference was seen when the demonstrator acquired their prestige on the
food-preference task rather than the artefact choice task. Other studies from naturally-occur-
ring groups have provided indirect evidence that prestige-bias may not be as domain-general
as suggested by Henrich & Gil-White. For example, one study found that prestige was unre-
lated to ethnobotanical medicinal knowledge in an indigenous Tsimane community, but
instead was related to having a formal position in that society [16]. Their measure of prestige
was the number of nominations received when others were asked to list all the important men
in the village, suggesting that being highly skilled and knowledgeable in the domain of medi-
cine does not translate to being an important man in the village generally, or gaining a formal
position. Similarly, a study of naturally-occurring volunteer groups in Cornwall, such as chess
or kayaking clubs, found that prestige ratings were not related to success in a quiz that the
group completed together, but were related to formal positions that the individuals already had
in their groups, such as teacher, team captain, or group organiser/secretary [17].
Here we present an experiment to directly assess the degree to which participants use
domain-specific or domain-general prestige cues when choosing from whom to learn, building
on our previous study [7]. As before, instead of manipulating prestige experimentally, we use
participant-generated prestige cues and manipulate the choices participants face to directly
compare the different types of cues, providing a suitable combination of naturalistic prestige-
generation yet also experimental manipulation of our key variable of interest (domain-specific-
ity). Participants answered quiz questions from four different topics: weight estimation, world
geography, art history, and language identification. We treat each of these topics as a ‘domain’,
and ask whether people use success-derived prestige in one domain/topic as a guide for who to
copy in a different domain/topic.
On each of 100 questions, participants could answer for themselves or copy another indi-
vidual (henceforth ‘demonstrator’) from their group. Depending on the experimental condi-
tion, participants could choose who to copy based on (1) the demonstrators’ scores on
questions from the current topic (domain-specific success) or (2) the number of times the
demonstrators were previously copied (our experimental proxy for prestige) on (a) questions
from the current topic (domain-specific prestige), (b) all topics (domain-general prestige) or
(c) a different topic (cross-domain prestige).
Our previous experiment using the same quiz and topics [7] found that participants’ scores
across both rounds of questions from the same topic were more strongly associated (r between
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0.55 and 0.78), than scores across both rounds of different topics (r between 0.24 and 0.6). The
associations between scores on a particular topic and overall score across rounds were inter-
mediate between these two ranges. These associations therefore indicate that domain-specific
scores (scores on questions within the same topic) are the most reliable cue to choose potential
demonstrators from whom to copy when answering questions from the same topic/domain,
compared to cross-domain or domain-general cues. Participants, however, were not informed
of these correlations, nor had any way to calculate them during the experiment.
Given that domain-specific prestige (derived from the same topic) should be most highly
correlated with score on the topic being answered, and that cross-domain prestige (derived
from a different topic) will be least correlated with score on the topic being answered, and
domain-general prestige bias (derived from all topics) will be intermediate, we formulated the
following hypotheses, preregistered at https://osf.io/93az8.
1. Domain-specific prestige-bias will be employed more often than domain-general prestige-
bias and cross-domain prestige
2. Domain-general prestige-bias will be employed more often than cross-domain prestige-
bias
3. Cross-domain prestige-bias is only employed when access to domain-general or domain-
specific prestige information is not available.
Methods
This research was granted ethical approval by the University of Exeter Biosciences ethics com-
mittee. Approval number: eCORN001806 v8.1.
Participants
Consistent with our previous study [7], we aimed to recruit ten groups of ten participants via
Mechanical Turk for each of four conditions, totaling 400 participants. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of ten groups within one of four conditions, giving a between-partici-
pant design. Due to difficulties in coordinating multiple groups of participants simultaneously,
some participants dropped out at various stages, giving a starting sample size of 397, with 332
participants reaching the final demographics page. We ensured a minimum of 5 participants
in each networked group throughout. All participants were above the age of 18 (age range 20–
69, mean age = 39.1), with 113 men and 78 women (not every participant specified their gen-
der). All were given a monetary reward for their time of USD$10, and had the opportunity of
winning a bonus payment of $20 if they scored over 85% in the quiz. 33 participants received
the $20 bonus payment. All participants provided informed consent before being able to pro-
ceed to the task. The consent form stated that their participation was entirely voluntary, their
data were entirely anonymous, and they could withdraw their involvement at any time by clos-
ing their browser.
Materials
The experimental automation platform Dallinger (dallinger.readthedocs.io) was used to create
an online game in which groups of players can play and interact simultaneously. Participants
answered 100 questions with two alternative answers each, one correct and one incorrect. The
100 questions were split into four topics of 25 questions each: geography, weight estimation,
language, and art (see Fig 1 for an example).
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Procedure
Participants were given 100 binary choice questions based on four different general-knowledge
or ‘trivia’ style topics, 25 in each category. Participants had fifteen seconds to answer each
question, and they scored one point for every question they answered correctly. On each ques-
tion, instead of answering themselves, participants could choose to “Ask Someone Else” by
clicking the corresponding button. This allowed them to see information about the other par-
ticipants (‘demonstrators’) in their group who had answered that question themselves (if
everyone chose to “Ask Someone Else” on a single question then participants were shown a
message saying “sorry, everyone chose to ‘ask someone else’ so no one can score points for this
Fig 1. Three example screenshots representing what participants saw at different stages of the experiment. The
top screenshot is an example question from the language topic. Participants could either select one of the two blue
buttons showing two possible answers (one correct, one incorrect), or select the red button labelled “Ask Someone
Else” which allows participants to copy someone else within their group. The number ‘7’ at the bottom is a countdown
timer that forces participants to answer within 15 seconds. The second image represents what a participant would see if
they chose to “Ask Someone Else” in Round 2 of Condition C, where they could choose to either view Times Chosen
Altogether (domain-general prestige) or Times Chosen On This Topic (domain-specific prestige). The bottom image
represents what a participant would see if they chose ‘Times Chosen Altogether’ and (domain-general prestige), in
which there were only two other players to choose from. Please note that for any given question, participants could
have between one and nine other participants to choose from, depending on how many answered individually for that
particular question. See Table 1 for the information combinations displayed in the other Conditions. See S1 File for
screenshots for all Conditions.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346.g001
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question” because there would be no answers available to copy for that question). The infor-
mation they saw depended on the condition, detailed in Table 1. They then chose a demonstra-
tor whose answer they used for that question. If the chosen demonstrator answered the
question correctly, the copying participant also scored a point for that question. If the demon-
strator was incorrect, they did not. No one received feedback on whether their answer was
right or wrong at any point.
In all conditions, the 100 questions were split into two rounds, 60 questions in Round 1 (15
from each topic), and 40 in Round 2 (10 from each topic). In Round 1, when participants
chose to “Ask Someone Else”, they always saw the current domain-specific score of all available
demonstrators. However, in Round 2, participants could choose between two kinds of infor-
mation, which varied according to the experimental condition (see Table 1). The information
available included domain-specific prestige (the number of times each demonstrator was cop-
ied on Round 1 questions from this topic), domain-general prestige (the number of times cop-
ied on all Round 1 topics), cross-domain prestige (the number of times copied on Round 1
questions from a randomly selected, different topic) and a random cue (each demonstrator’s
Player ID, which was a randomly generated 3 digit number). The four conditions pitted differ-
ent pairs of information against each other, to establish participants’ preferences, and across
the four conditions we constructed a hierarchy of information, from most to least preferred.
Pre-registered predictions and analyses
The following sets of predictions were preregistered at https://osf.io/93az8. Predictions 1–3 are
assumption checks, to make sure that the correlations within and across domains were suitable
for testing the subsequent predictions. Predictions 4–6 are our main theoretically-derived, a
priori predictions shown in Table 1. Predictions 7 and 8 are follow-up predictions looking at
copying frequency and score across conditions. Finally, we have predictions related to our pre-
registered follow-up Condition, (Condition D), which was run after analysing results for Con-
ditions A-C, as specified in the pre-registration (p.7 heading “Follow-up Analyses”). Please
note that Assumption Check 1 differs to our preregistration. This was an oversight, as we
wanted to check the assumption that participant scores were more tightly correlated within
compared to between topics, not participant prestige, in the same way that we did for our pre-
vious study (Brand et al. 2020).
To analyse our data we ran a series of Bayesian multi-level mixed models using the Rethink-
ing package version 1.90 [18] in R version 3.6.0 [19]. Our raw data and analysis scripts can be
found at https://github.com/lottybrand/Prestige_2_Analysis. Each model corresponding to
each prediction is also included in the S1 File. Model parameters are interpreted as providing
evidence of an effect on the outcome if their 89% credible interval (CI) did not cross zero, with
Table 1. Information displayed when choosing to “Ask Someone Else” in Rounds 1 and 2 across conditions, with our predicted choice for Round 2 in bold.







Domain-specific prestige Or Cross-
domain prestige
Domain-general prestige Or Cross-
domain prestige




Specific v Cross (Condition A) compares domain-specific and cross-domain prestige; General v Cross (Condition B) compares domain-general and cross-domain
prestige; Specific v General (Condition C) compares domain-specific and domain-general prestige; and Cross v Random (Condition D�) compares cross-domain
prestige with a random cue entirely unconnected to success in the task. Please note Condition D was run separately after confirmatory analysis on Conditions A- C, as
specified on p.7 of our Pre-registration.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346.t001
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89% CIs the default value in the Rethinking package. 89% credible intervals are used to prevent
readers from confusing these with the widely-used 95% confidence intervals and performing
unconscious significance tests [18]. Priors were chosen to be weakly regularising, in order to
control for both under and overfitting the model to the data. Convergence criteria such as
effective sample sizes and Rhat values were used to check for appropriate model convergence
throughout, and trace plots were inspected for signs of incomplete mixing when necessary.
Predictions 1–3 (assumption checks)
1. Domain-specific scores (i.e. the number of times a participant scored correctly in each
topic) are more highly correlated between rounds than domain-general score or cross-
domain score. This is an assumption check based on our previous findings and the experi-
mental set-up. If this prediction is not upheld it suggests the topics were more tightly corre-
lated than anticipated, and our following predictions may not hold. To test Prediction 1 we
calculated Pearson’s Correlation Coefficients between participant’s asocial scores in Round
1 and Round 2 within each topic, and compared these to correlation coefficients between
different topics, and compared to overall score.
2. Across all conditions, when choosing to “Ask Someone Else” in Round 1, participants pref-
erentially copy the highest-scoring demonstrator. This is an assumption-check, to make
sure that subsequent copying frequency cues are genuine signals of performance, and a rep-
lication of our previous findings. To test this prediction we scored each trial for whether or
not the participant chose to copy the highest scoring demonstrator available for each copy-
ing instance, and used this as the outcome variable in a binomial model with varying inter-
cepts for group and participant. (Model 1 in S1 File).
3. Across all conditions, when choosing to “Ask Someone Else” in Round 2, participants pref-
erentially copy the most-copied demonstrator. This is an assumption-check to make sure
that people are actually employing prestige-bias when it is potentially useful, and a replica-
tion of our previous findings. To test this prediction we scored each trial for whether or not
the participant chose to copy the most copied demonstrator available for each copying
instance, and modelled this as above (Model 2 in S1 File).
Predictions 4–6 (main A-priori predictions)
4. In the Specific v Cross Condition (A), participants will predominantly choose to copy
based on domain-specific prestige, rather than cross-domain prestige, as domain-specific
prestige will be most correlated to score on the relevant domain.
5. In the General v Cross Condition (B), participants will predominantly choose to copy
based on domain-general prestige, rather than cross-domain prestige, as domain-general
prestige will be more correlated to score on the relevant domain than cross-domain pres-
tige (as it contains the topic-specific score within it).
6. In the Specific v General Condition (C), participants will predominantly choose to copy
based on domain-specific prestige rather than domain-general prestige, as domain-spe-
cific prestige will be more correlated to score on the relevant domain.
To test Predictions 4, 5 and 6 a generalised linear mixed model (Model 3 in S1 File) of all
data from Round 2 was used with “chose predicted” (i.e. chose to view the information that we
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predict in each condition) as the binomial outcome variable (yes or no), with varying inter-
cepts for participant, group and condition.
Predictions 7–8 (follow-up predictions)
7. The overall frequency of copying (i.e. choosing to “Ask Someone Else”) is higher in the
Specific v Cross Condition (A) and the Specific v General Condition (C) than in the Gen-
eral v Cross Condition (B). This is because Conditions A and C both provide domain-
specific prestige information which is a more direct cue to domain-specific success,
whereas Condition B provides only indirect cues to domain-specific score. To test this
prediction, a generalized linear mixed model of all data from Round 2 was used with ‘cop-
ied’ as the binomial outcome variable (i.e. chose “Ask Someone Else” or not)
8. Similarly to above, participants score higher in Conditions in which domain-specific
prestige is available because they provide more tightly correlated cues to success with the
relevant domain. To test this prediction, a general linear mixed model of data from each
condition was used with final score of each participant as the outcome variable and con-
dition as the predictor variable, with a varying intercept for participant and group.
Unregistered predictions
As laid out in the preregistration (p.7 under heading “Follow-up Analyses”), after collecting
and analysing data for Conditions A-C and confirming that participants showed a clear prefer-
ence for domain-specific information over cross-domain and domain-general prestige, we
then collected additional data for Condition D which compared cross-domain prestige (the
least preferred information) with a random cue (Player ID number). Thus for Condition D,
we predicted that participants would predominantly choose to copy based on cross-domain
prestige rather than the random cue, as cross-domain prestige contains some correlation with
score, whereas the random cue does not. Because Condition D contains the least favoured
information, we also predicted lower copying rates and lower scores than the other conditions.
Results
Assumption check (Prediction 1)
As predicted, scores were more strongly associated between Rounds 1 and 2 of the same topic
than they were between different topics (Table 2), except for the Geography topic in which the
within-topic correlation (r = .47) was lower than two cross-topic correlations (Art (r = .55)
and Language (r = .51)). Also as predicted, the overall Round 1 score was intermediate between
the within-topic associations and the cross-topic associations for Art and Weight, but not for
Geography and Language where the overall correlation was higher than the within-topic corre-
lation. This latter unexpected finding may reflect the fact that overall score contains four times
as much data as does the score for any specific topic.
Assumption checks (Predictions 2 and 3)
As predicted, when participants chose to copy others in Round 1 they preferentially copied the
most successful (i.e. highest scoring) demonstrator out of all those available (mean intercept
estimate: 3.15, 89% CI: 2.77, 3.55, this corresponds to participants choosing the highest scoring
model 95.9% of the time on the probability scale). When participants chose to copy in Round
2, participants preferentially copied the most prestigious (i.e. most copied) demonstrator out
PLOS ONE The domain-specificity of prestige-biased social learning
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of all those available (mean intercept estimate: 4.29, 89% CI: 3.59, 5.10, this corresponds to par-
ticipants choosing the highest scoring model 98.6% of the time on the probability scale).
A-priori hypothesis tests (Predictions 4, 5 and 6)
As shown in the raw data presented in Fig 2, participants preferred the domain-specific pres-
tige cue when available, followed by domain-general, then cross-domain, and finally random
cues, as predicted. Our models confirmed that participants preferentially chose the predicted
information as opposed to the alternative information in each condition we tested, showing a
strong preference for the predicted information (see Fig 3; Condition A: mean: 3.05 89% CI:
2.42, 3.73 Condition B: 2.51, 89% CI: 1.90, 3.16, Condition C: mean: 2.84, 89% CI: 2.24, 3.46
Condition D: 2.10, 89% CI: 1.34, 2.87).
Follow-up analyses (Prediction 7)
Our model did not provide strong evidence of a difference in copying frequency between Con-
ditions A (18% copying rate, n = 3240), B (14% copying rate, n = 3437) and C (20% copying
rate, n = 3377), however there is evidence of participants copying less in Condition D com-
pared to the other conditions (7% copying rate, n = 3416). This was confirmed by computing
contrasts between the estimates of the four conditions (mean difference between Conditions A
and D: 1.77, 89% CI: 0.72, 2.81. Mean difference between Conditions B and D: 1.26, 89% CI:
0.29, 2.24. Mean difference between Conditions C and D: 1.83, 89% CI: 0.76, 2.86).
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between Round 1 and Round 2 topic scores representing total variance of Round
2 topic score explained by Round 1 score of the same topic.
Round 1 asocial score Round 2 asocial score Correlation coefficient (95% confidence intervals)
Art Art 0.71 (0.66, 0.76)
Geography Art 0.43 (0.43, 0.52)
Language Art 0.50 (0.41, 0.58)
Weight Art 0.38 (0.29, 0.47)
Overall Round 1 Score Art 0.64 (0.57, 0.70)
Geography Geography 0.47 (0.38, 0.55)
Art Geography 0.55 (0.47, 0.62)
Language Geography 0.51 (0.42, 0.58)
Weight Geography 0.38 (0.29, 0.47)
Overall Round 1 Score Geography 0.59 (0.52, 0.66)
Language Language 0.59 (0.51, 0.65)
Art Language 0.54 (0.46, 0.62)
Geography Language 0.42 (0.33, 0.51)
Weight Language 0.37 (0.28, 0.46)
Overall Round 1 Score Language 0.60 (0.53, 0.67)
Weight Weight 0.57 (0.49, 0.63)
Art Weight 0.47 (0.39, 0.55)
Geography Weight 0.29 (0.19, 0.39)
Language Weight 0.42 (0.33, 0.51)
Overall Round 1 Score Weight 0.55 (0.47, 0.62)
All scores are participants’ asocial score, so only includes scores they achieved without copying others. Bold
coefficients shows highest association for that topic.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346.t002
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Fig 2. Raw counts of the information chosen when participants chose to copy someone else’s answer in Round 2.
Total possible copying instances for each condition in Round 2 were: Condition A = 3240, Condition B = 3437,
Condition C = 3377, Condition D = 3416.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346.g002
Fig 3. Model predictions for participants choosing the predicted information compared to the alternative
information in Round 2 of the four conditions, on the probability scale.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255346.g003
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Follow-up analysis (Prediction 8)
Similarly to prediction 7, there was not strong evidence that participants scored differently
between Conditions A (mean score 71.1%), B (71.6%) and C (72.5%). However, there was
strong evidence that participants scored lower in Condition D (mean score 63.5%) compared
to Condition C only. This was confirmed by computing contrasts between the conditions
(mean difference between Condition D and C: -1.15, 89% CI: -2.23, 0.04). When looking at
just the Round 2 scores (in which there was a difference in the information participants could
choose), participants scored lower in Condition D (mean score 24.8) compared to Condition
B (mean score 27.4, mean difference -1.18 89% CI: -2.02–0.33) and Condition C (mean score
27.4, mean difference -1.19 89% CI: -2.03, -0.32), but not Condition A (mean score 26.5).
The S1 File contains model specifications, a comparison with our previous prestige study
that used a similar design [7] and further exploratory analyses, including results showing that
copying rate predicts score, and plots showing individual variation in prestige score and copy-
ing rate.
Discussion
In order to acquire adaptive information, people often preferentially learn from prestigious
individuals, where ‘prestige’ is acquired by being observed and copied by others. While this
prestige-biased social learning has been demonstrated in previous research [7], uncertainty
remains over the extent to which prestige bias is domain-specific, where people preferentially
copy others who have acquired prestige in the same domain as what is being copied, or
domain-general, where people preferentially copy others who are generally copied on a range
of domains. In this study we experimentally tested whether participants adopted a domain-
specific prestige-bias or a domain-general prestige-bias when both options were available to
them during an online quiz. This quiz contained different topics that represented different
‘domains’ of knowledge. Participants were able to copy other players’ quiz answers based on
their domain/topic-specific scores in Round 1 of the quiz, and were then able to copy other
players based on how many times they had previously been copied by others (our measure of
‘prestige’) in Round 2 of the quiz. In a series of pair-wise comparisons between prestige cue
types, we found that participants overwhelmingly chose to use domain-specific prestige cues
(times copied in the same topic) over both domain-general (time copied overall) and cross-
domain (times copied in a different randomly chosen topic) prestige cues, that they preferred
domain-general to cross-domain cues, and that they preferred cross-domain to a random cue
entirely unconnected to success in the task. We therefore revealed a ‘hierarchy’ of prestige cues
in which the most favoured cue, when available, was domain-specific prestige, followed by
domain-general, then cross-domain, and lastly random cues. Importantly, as with our previous
work [7], prestige cues were an emergent property of participants’ behaviour during the exper-
iment; no deception or manipulation of prestige cues was employed at any time, thus increas-
ing our confidence that such effects might be observed in the real world.
This study adds to the already extensive body of work which shows that people tend to use
social information in an adaptive and flexible way, depending on the information that is avail-
able to them [5,6,20]. We also provide further evidence of success-biased social learning, in
that participants copied the highest scoring player available to them when copying based on
score in Round 1 [5,7,21]. Participants also copied the most-copied player available to them
when copying based on prestige in Round 2. Our results also support previous evidence sug-
gesting that participants are sensitive to the domain-specificity of prestige when copying or
learning from others [10,16,17].
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Our study used different topics of a quiz to represent different domains of knowledge, and
participants’ scores in Round 1 of a given topic were generally better predictors of their score
in Round 2 of the same topic than of any other topic. Thus, copying based on domain-specific
prestige was most adaptive for increasing a player’s chances of selecting the correct answer on
any given question, and ultimately in achieving a high score (and bonus payment) in the quiz.
As the quiz was played live by groups of participants with no feedback on their scores, partici-
pants did not have access to how correlated scores were within or between topics. Participants
did have experience of each topic in Round 1, presumably aiding their assessment of how
related the topics were. Similarly, in real life people do not have direct access to data on how
correlated different domains of skill or knowledge are, but presumably gain an intuitive under-
standing based on their experience or exposure to different domains during their lifetimes.
Our predictions assume that people have an intuitive sense of which domains should be corre-
lated, based on their experience. Thus, an individual’s tendency to prefer domain-specificity
over generality relies on their own understanding or assessment of how correlated the domains
might be. How accurate their perceptions of the correlations are depends on their own experi-
ence and expertise in those domains, and likely emerges either through unconscious associa-
tive learning, conscious deliberation, or a combination of the two. If direct experience of a
domain is lacking, intuitions might be based on stereotypes or folk understanding, leading to
inaccurate assessment of relationships between domains, and maladaptive use of prestige-bias.
We feel our results are reassuring, in that they suggest people are sensitive to the source of peo-
ple’s prestige, and that if access to a more relevant source is provided, they will preferentially
use it over a less accurate source.
We found strong evidence that participants prefer domain-specific prestige cues to cross-
domain prestige-cues, i.e. they would rather copy the answer of someone who was copied
extensively on the current topic, than someone who was copied extensively on a different
topic. Our topics were explicitly labelled as different to each other, and participants had experi-
ence of each topic in Round 1. This explicit labelling and direct experience may be responsible
for participants’ strong domain-specific bias. However, if topics were more alike, participants
may not show such a strong preference for domain-specific prestige. Importantly, if they had
less experience of the topics or if the topics were unfamiliar to them, they may be less able to
make a judgement about their correlations. For example, an individual unfamiliar with science
may see both a physicist and a biologist as belonging to the same domain of expertise, ‘scien-
tist’, and perhaps incorrectly choose to learn about physics from a biologist. The biologist may
be a better model compared to an historian or an artist, but another scientist might choose the
more domain-specific model, i.e. the physicist. This may help to explain why prestigious indi-
viduals often influence others on topics outside of their domain of expertise, especially within
celebrity culture and social media platforms such as Twitter. It may be more informative for
someone to listen to a prestigious children’s author on a topic related to biology if they have
no other access to biology experts. However another biologist may choose not to listen to a
children’s author on this topic as they have access to plenty of other biologist models. Perhaps
if people had wider and more direct access to experts on particular topics, they would preferen-
tially weight the opinion of the expert in their domain of expertise rather than someone who
had gained expertise in an unrelated different topic. An anecdotal example of this has been
demonstrated during the Covid-19 pandemic, in which many scientists have started following
epidemiologists on Twitter in order to gain the most domain-specific information relating to
the pandemic. However, those outside of science may view any Biologist as equally prestigious,
despite having no epidemiological expertise.
As noted by Henrich & Gil-White [11], the emergence of domain-general prestige depends
on whether success in multiple domains depends on a common underlying trait. In our quiz,
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the topics were chosen to be as dissimilar to each other as possible (within the constraints of
an online quiz), however we showed that performance across topics was to some extent corre-
lated, either because the domains are drawing on similar cognitive abilities, or because success
across domains is correlated with an underlying trait such as education, socioeconomic status,
or ‘general intelligence’ such as ‘g’ [22–25]. The theoretical justifications and debates sur-
rounding the construct of g are beyond the scope of this paper, but if theoretical and statistical
models of g are reliable and replicable, then this would support the argument that domain-gen-
eral prestige-bias can often be as adaptive as, if not more adaptive than, domain-specific pres-
tige. Just as a general intelligence factor may underpin general cognitive abilities, success
across many broad areas of societal interest, such as politics, science or ethics, could plausibly
be correlated with underlying traits such as reasoning, decision-making, or evidence-based
judgement. For this reason it could be adaptive to use domain-general prestige-bias for large-
scale decisions. For example, for successful decision-making on climate change policy, an
understanding of data, evidence gathering, political landscapes and policy logistics may all be
necessary, and may all be reliant on common training, expertise or experience. In this way, a
renowned “thinker” or “intellectual” (e.g. a broad-scope podcast host such as Sean Carroll)
may be just as informative on climate policy as a climate scientist; the climate scientist may
know the climate change data exceptionally well but may not have any experience of the politi-
cal landscape or policy logistics.
Interestingly, domain-specific prestige was overwhelmingly preferred to domain-general
prestige, even though in our experimental setup the former actually contained a lower volume
of information, being based on 15 topic-specific questions from Round 1, than the latter,
which was based on all 60 questions from Round 1 (and indeed overall score in Round 1 was a
better predictor of topic specific score in Round 2 in two out of four topics). Thus the domain-
general prestige information included copying instances from four times as many questions
compared to the domain-specific prestige information. This difference in information was also
reflected in the prestige scores visible to participants, in that more copying instances would
have occurred across all topics compared to within each topic. This suggests that people might
be less sensitive to the amount of information than might be expected. Whether our experi-
mental set-up reflects real life depends on a trade-off between depth and breadth of expertise.
For example, someone may have a long history of prestige in biology generally, thus lots of
information has been gathered about their success as a biologist. Someone else may have
recently gained expertise in a specific area of biology, such as molecular genetics. Our results
suggest people would rather learn molecular genetics from the recently trained molecular
genetics expert than the long-standing general biology expert. Similarly, if someone is
renowned for being generally successful or knowledgeable in a variety of domains, do we have
more information about their expertise than about the expertise of someone who is a long-
time expert in a narrower field? This trade-off between depth and breadth of expertise is an
open-question and one worth investigating when trying to understand who people choose to
learn from and why.
In summary, we find evidence that domain-specific prestige-bias is preferred to both cross-
domain and domain-general prestige-bias, at least when the domains of interest are sufficiently
dissimilar to each other, and when individuals have had experience of each domain. Partici-
pants revealed a hierarchy of prestige in that domain-specific prestige was most preferred, fol-
lowed by domain-general, and cross-domain prestige was least preferred. This preference was
present despite the fact that the domain-general prestige scores contained more information
(were generated based on all topics) compared to domain-specific prestige scores (generated
from one topic). This apparent trading of depth over breadth of expertise warrants further
experimental investigation to understand who people learn from and why.
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